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Abstract.
In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the
performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy A performs better than strategy
B, strategy A will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single
mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze
the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. We
show analytically that these times depend on the payoff matrix of the game in an
amazingly simple way under weak selection, i. e. strong stochasticity: The payoff
difference ∆pi is a linear function of the number of A individuals i, ∆pi = u i + v.
The unconditional mean exit time depends only on the constant term v. Given
that a single A mutant takes over the population, the corresponding conditional
mean exit time depends only on the density dependent term u. We demonstrate
this finding for two commonly applied microscopic evolutionary processes.
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1. Introduction
Systems in which successful strategies spread by imitation or genetic reproduction
can be described by evolutionary game theory. Such models are routinely analyzed
in evolutionary biology, sociology, anthropology and economics. Recently, the
application of methods from statistical physics to these systems has lead to many
important insights [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
Traditionally, the dynamics is described by the replicator equations, where the
growth rate of a strategy is associated with its relative success compared with the
population average [6, 7].
In the past years, research has focused on stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
in finite populations [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. In this
context, a connection to the weak selection limit of population genetics has been
established [8]. Weak selection means that the payoff differences based on different
strategic behavior in interactions represent only a small correction to otherwise
random dynamics, similar to high temperature expansions in physics. Weak selection
is considered as a relevant limit in biology, as most evolutionary changes are driven
by small fitness differences [23]. Moreover, it allows analytical approximations that
are often impossible when selective differences in payoffs are large [8, 24, 25].
Most of the recent work that uses the weak selection approximation has been
focusing on the probability that a certain strategy takes over. The time associated
with this process has been calculated [26], but it received considerably less attention
so far. Here, we present the weak selection corrections to the conditional and
unconditional mean exit or fixation times in evolutionary 2×2 games with N players.
The conditional average time to fixation tA1 is the expected time a single mutant
needs to take over the population, given that such a takeover occurs at all. The
unconditional average time of fixation t1 is the expectation value for the time until
the population is homogenous again after the arrival of a single mutant. This is
regardless of wether the mutant type takes over the population or becomes extinct.
Equivalently, the average fixation times for such one dimensional random walks can
also be interpreted as mean first passage times or mean exit times [27, 28, 29].
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Throughout this paper, we use the payoff matrix
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
. (1)
An A player interacting with another A receives a. If it interacts with B, it obtains
b. Similarly, B receives c from A and d from other B's. Thus, the average payoffs
are
piA(i) =
i− 1
N − 1 a+
N − i
N − 1 b (2)
piB(i) =
i
N − 1 c+
N − i− 1
N − 1 d. (3)
A quantity that is of particular interest is the difference between the average payoffs,
∆pi(i) = piA(i)− piB(i) = u i+ v, (4)
where
u =
a+ d− (b+ c)
N − 1 , (5)
v =
N(b− d)− (a− d)
N − 1 . (6)
We show that under weak selection, the conditional time (tA1 ) during which a single
mutant takes over the whole population depends only on u (and, of course, on the
population size). The unconditional time (t1) during which the mutant either takes
over the population or reaches extinction depends only on v (and the population
size). See Figure 1 for an illustration of the relevant quantities.
Our manuscript is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce a particular
evolutionary process for our analysis. Although our results are valid for a broader
class of processes, we only present the full calculation for this evolutionary process.
In Section 3, we recall the general form of fixation probabilities and times. We discuss
neutral selection in Section 4 as a prerequisite to the weak selection expansion, which
we explore in Section 5. In Section 6 we address the frequency dependent Moran
process to underline the generality of our findings. The consequences of our analytical
results are discussed in Section 7.
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B
1
A
1
Number of A players
1
Number of A players 0
1
Number of A players N
1
Number of A players i
1
Number of A players 1
1
Number of A players 1
φ1(β, N, u, v) (1)
tA1 (β, N, u) (2)
t1(β, N, v) (3)
1
T−i (β, N, u, v) T
+
i (β, N, u, v)
tA1 (β, N, u)
φ1(β, N, u, v)
Figure 1: Illustration of the most relevant quantities. We are interested in the evolutionary fate of
a single A player. All quantities depend on the intensity of selection β and the population size N .
The payoff difference between A and B players is given by ∆pi = u i + v, with i as the number of
A players. Both the transition probabilities T+i and T
−
i and the probability that a single A player
takes over the population φ1 depend on u and v. But for weak selection, β  1, the conditional
time tA1 during which a single A player takes over a population of B players only depends on u,
whereas the unconditional time t1 until either A or B has taken over the population only depends
on v.
2. Fermi process
In a finite population of size N with two possible strategies A and B, the state of
the system is characterized by the number of type A individuals i. In general, the
dynamics is stochastic. In each time step, a randomly chosen individual evaluates
its sucess. It compares this payoff with a second, randomly chosen individual. If
this second individual has a higher payoff, the first one switches strategies with
probability p > 1
2
. Otherwise, it switches with p < 1
2
. We assume that the switching
probability is given by the Fermi distribution. Its shape is controlled by the intensity
of selection β, which can be interpreted as an inverse temperature,
p±i =
1
1 + e∓β(piA(i)−piB(i))
=
1
1 + e∓β∆pi(i)
. (7)
In previous work [30, 31, 32], there is a different strategy update procedure. The
first individual switches to the second's strategy with probability p±i . The second
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individual can also switch to the first individual's strategy with probability 1 − p±i .
This yields a factor 2 in the transition probabilities (and, as we will become clear
later, a factor 1
2
in the fixation times). This process also has a proper strong
selection limit, i. e. it is possible to examine β → ∞. In this latter case we have
p±i → Θ(∆pi(i)), where Θ(x) is the step function.
The population size is constant in time, in each time step the state of the system
can at most change by one, i. e. from i to i−1 or to i+1. The transition probabilities
T±i to move from i to i± 1 are
T±i =
i
N
N − i
N
p±i . (8)
The probability to stay in the current state is 1− T+i − T−i . An important measure
of where the system is more likely to move is their ratio,
γi =
T−i
T+i
= e−β∆pi(i). (9)
This is a quantity that describes the tendency to move from the state i to i ∓ 1,
depending on whether γi ≷ 1. Of course, T+i > 0 is required, which follows from
β < ∞. The T±i and thus the γi are invariant under adding a value to each of the
payoffs given in (1), whereas multiplying the payoff matrix with a factor λ results in
a change in the intensity of selection β˜ = β λ.
Let us now focus on weak selection, β  1. In this case we have
p±i ≈
1
2
± β
4
∆pi(i). (10)
Weak selection corresponds to high temperature in Fermi statistics. A Taylor
expansion of the γi up to first order in β yields γi ≈ 1 − β∆pi(i). In this case,
the probability to move from i to i + 1 is very similar to the probability to move
from i to i − 1. Weak selection links the Fermi process to a variety of birth death
processes, cf. [8, 33].
3. Fixation probabilities and fixation times
From equation (8) it follows that the two pure states all A or all B are absorbing,
T±0 = T
±
N = 0. In a finite population, we can calculate the probability φi that the
system will fixate to the pure state all A, starting with the mixed state i. Obviously,
we have φ0 = 0 and φN = 1. For 0 < i < N , there is a balance equation for the
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fixation probabilities, φi = T
−
i φi−1 + (1−T+i −T−i )φi +T+i φi+1. This recursion leads
to an expression for the fixation probabilities in terms of the γi [34, 35, 36],
φi =
1 +
∑i−1
k=1
∏k
l=1 γl
1 +
∑N−1
k=1
∏k
l=1 γl
, (11)
which is valid for any birth death process.
For the Fermi process, the exact equation (9) simplifies matters in an elegant
way because the products in equation (11) can be solved,
k∏
l=1
γl = exp
{
−β
k∑
l=1
∆pi(l)
}
= exp
{
−β
[
k2
u
2
+ k
(u
2
+ v
)]}
. (12)
Hence, equation (11) simplifies to
φi =
1 +
∑i−1
k=1 exp
{−β [k2 u
2
+ k(u
2
+ v)
]}
1 +
∑N−1
k=1 exp
{−β [k2 u
2
+ k(u
2
+ v)
]} . (13)
For large N , the sums in equation (13) can be approximated by integrals, which
yields a closed expression for the probabilities φi [33, 37].
General expressions for the unconditional and conditional mean exit times
or average times of fixation, t1 and t
A
1 , are well known, especially for simple,
translational invariant random walks [26, 27, 38]. A complete derivation for the
average times of fixation in finite systems without translational invariance can be
found in [26, 35, 39].
In the following, we will focus on the fixation of a single Amutant in a population
of B. Accordingly, the unconditional and conditional fixation times read
t1 = φ1
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
1
T+l
k∏
m=l+1
γm, (14)
and
tA1 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
φl
T+l
k∏
m=l+1
γm, (15)
respectively. Time is measured in elementary time steps here. Thus, in each time
step one reproductive event occurs. In biological contexts, it is often more convenient
to measure time in generations, such that each individual reproduces once per
generation on average. Time in generations is obtained by dividing the number
of time steps by the population size N . It is well known that the variance of the
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exit times under weak selection can be large [39], which has important biomedical
implications [40]. Nonetheless, here we concentrate on the expectation values and
do not address the distribution of the exit times.
4. Neutral selection
An important reference case is neutral selection, which results from vanishing
selection intensity β = 0 [41]. Neutral selection is a very general limit, which is
typically not affected by the details of the evolutionary process. For neutral selection
we have γi = 1, that is T
+
i = T
−
i in any state i. However, we still have T
±
i 6= T±j
for i 6= j, although the system is symmetric, T±i = T±N−i. This is a difference to the
simple random walk in one dimension, which is invariant with respect to translation
[29].
For the Fermi process, the neutral transition probabilities are
T±i
∣∣∣
β=0
=
1
2
i
N
N − i
N
. (16)
We have T+i = T
−
i , which leads to γi = 1. From equation (11), it is thus clear that
the probability of fixation to A is given by the initial abundance of A,
φi
∣∣∣
β=0
=
i
N
. (17)
For the neutral unconditional time of fixation t1 we get
t1
∣∣∣
β=0
=
1
N
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
2N2
l(N − l) = 2N HN−1. (18)
Details for this calculation can be found in Appendix A. We introduced the shorthand
notation for the harmonic numbers HN−1 =
∑N−1
l=1
1
l
, which diverge logarithmically
with N . In the same way we can solve
tA1 |β=0 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
l
N
2N2
l(N − l) = 2N(N − 1). (19)
For neutral selection, the conditional average time of fixation of a single mutant
diverges quadratically with the system size.
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5. Weak Selection
In this section we will calculate the linear corrections of the mean exit times or
fixation times t1, and t
A
1 under weak selection, β  1. Of course, all weak selection
approximations are valid only if the term linear in β is small compared to the constant
term.
The fixation probabilities for small β are
φi ≈ i
N
+
i
N
(N − i)(N + i)u+ 3v
6
β, (20)
which has been derived for a variety of evolutionary processes before [8, 10, 12, 35,
36, 42].
Next, we address the weak selection approximation of the fixation times. The
expectation value of the unconditional fixation time of a single A mutant in a
population ofB is in general given by the exact equation (14). With the the transition
and fixation probabilities of the Fermi process, the unconditional fixation time of
absorption at any boundary simplifies to
t1 = φ1
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
N2
l(N − l)
(
1 + e−β(u l+v)
)
× exp
{
−β
k∑
m=l+1
∆pi(m)
}
. (21)
The weak selection approximation takes the remarkably simple form (see Appendix
B for details)
t1 ≈ 2NHN−1 + v N (N − 1−HN−1) β, (22)
with v given in (6). Thus, t1 depends only on the constant term of the payoff
difference. For large N , this yields v ≈ b − d. That is, for large populations under
weak selection the linear correction of the average fixation time only depends on
the advantage (or disadvantage) of the A mutants in the resident population. For
b > d, invasion of A mutants is likely and slows down the time until the population
is homogeneous again. For d > b, it is difficult for A to invade a B population and
extinction of the mutants is faster than in the neutral case. Note that the payoff
entries a and c have no influence on the unconditional fixation time under weak
selection corrections. Since fixation is unlikely for weak selection (the probability of
fixation of a single A mutant is approximately N−1), the unconditional fixation time
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is dominated by the fixation to B. In this case, it is enough to discuss the invasion
of A mutants.
Next, we address the average time to fixation given that the A mutant takes
over the population. With the general result (15) the Fermi processes conditional
fixation time to all A reads
tA1 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
φl
N2
l(N − l)
(
1 + e−β(u l+v)
)
× exp
{
−β
k∑
m=1+l
∆pi(m)
}
. (23)
Its linear approximation turns out to be dependent on the payoffs in a very simple
way as well,
tA1 ≈ 2N(N − 1)− uN(N − 1)
N2 +N − 6
18
β, (24)
with u(N − 1) = a− b− c + d. The detailed calculation can be found in Appendix
B. Since during the fixation process all payoffs are of importance, it is obvious that
they all enter here. For example, when it is easy to invade because few mutants
have an advantage (b > d), but difficult to reach fixation because mutants are
disadvantageous once they are frequent (c > a), we have u < 0 and the conditional
time to fixation is larger than neutral. In the last section, we discuss special classes of
games to show that, under weak selection, the conditional mean exit times of fixation
(or absorption) do not always follow the intuition based on the payoff matrix (1).
6. Frequency dependent Moran process
In this section we address the generality of the previous findings discussing an
alternative evolutionary process. The first model that connects payoffs from a 2× 2
game to reproductive fitness using a weak selection approach in finite populations
is the frequency dependent Moran process [8, 9]. In this process, an individual is
chosen for reproduction with probability proportional to its fitness f(i). The offspring
replaces a randomly chosen individual. The average payoffs (2) and (3) are mapped
to the fitness such that fA(i) = 1− β + β piA(i) and fB(i) = 1− β + β piB(i), where
the selcetion intensity β > 0 is so small that fA(i) > 0 and fB(i) > 0. The transition
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probabilities of the standard Moran process read
T+i =
ifA(i)
ifA(i) + (N − i)fB(i)
N − i
N
, (25)
T−i =
(N − i)fB(i)
ifA(i) + (N − i)fB(i)
i
N
. (26)
Although these transition probabilities are different from those of the Fermi process,
they also yield γi ≈ 1 − ∆pi(i) and
∏k
m=l+1 γm ≈ 1 − β
∑k
m=l+1 ∆pi(m) for
weak selection, β  1. Thus, the weak selection approximations of the fixation
probabilities φl of the Moran process and the Fermi process are identical, see equation
(20). But the weak selection approximation of the transition probabilities are not
identical, which leads consequently to different mean exit times. Nevertheless, the
results have the same, remarkably simple connection to the payoff matrix (1). The
mean exit times or fixation times of the frequency dependent Moran process are
t1 ≈ NHN−1 + v N
2
(N + 1− 2HN) β, (27)
tA1 ≈ N(N − 1)− u
N2(N2 − 3N + 2)
36
β. (28)
Qualitatively, the dependence on the payoff matrix via u and v is the same as for the
Fermi process. Their calculation is analogous to the findings of the previous section,
details can be found in Appendix B. Note that, comparing with the Fermi process,
there is a factor of 2 missing in the neutral terms. However, this can be avoided by
rescaling the transition probabilities, without changing the properties of the different
processes.
7. Discussion
Finally, let us discuss the implications of our results for general 2× 2 games. While
we concentrate on the Fermi process here, the discussion is equally valid for the
frequency dependent Moran process. An important question is whether the linear
correction for weak selection is compatible with the general features of the game and
the known asymptotic behavior for large N of the mean exit or fixation times derived
by Antal and Scheuring [26]. Clearly, this depends on the payoff matrix of the 2× 2
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game,
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
, (29)
as the payoffs enter the first exit times of absorption linearly. To analyze the
difference to the neutral case we consider the rescaled average times of fixation,
τ1(β) = t1(β)/t1(0) and τ
A
1 (β) = t
A
1 (β)/t
A
1 (0). The rescaled unconditional fixation
time reads
τ1 ≈ 1 + 1
2
N(b− d)− a+ d
N − 1
(
N − 1
HN−1
− 1
)
β. (30)
Accordingly, the rescaled conditional fixation time for absorption at all A is
τA1 ≈ 1−
a− b− c+ d
N − 1
N2 +N − 6
36
β. (31)
Note that for population sizes N > 2 and sufficiently small β, we always have t1(0) <
tA1 (0). In other words, the average time until the A individual has reached fixation
or gone extinct is smaller than the conditional average time until the A individual
has reached fixation. For β →∞, the process follows deterministically the intensity
of selection and thus both fixation times may coincide, t1(β → ∞) ≈ tA1 (β → ∞).
This ordering of the fixation times is blurred by our rescaling, as we focus only on
the change relative to the neutral case.
In the following, we discuss these two expressions for the three generic types of
2 × 2 games, namely dominance of A (a > c and b > d), coexistence of A and B
(a < b and c > d) and a coordination game (a > c and b < d).
7.1. Dominance of A.
Consider a game where strategy A is always dominant, i. e. it obtains a larger payoff
than B, regardless of the fraction of A in the population. This is the case for a > c
and b > d. One special case is the Prisoner's Dilemma with b > d > a > c.
The interesting feature of this game is that the social optimum d is not the Nash
equilibrium, which is a. For neutral selection, a single A individual goes extinct with
probability 1 − N−1. Thus, the unconditional fixation time τ1 is dominated by the
extinction of A. Since strategy A is favored by selection, increasing the intensity
of selection decreases the probability of the extinction of A. Since fixation takes
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at least N − 1 time steps, τ1 increases with increasing intensity of selection β. For
large N , this is obvious from our equation (30), because in this case the quantity
N(b−d)−a+d is positive. However, once extinction of A becomes unlikely, increasing
β further will lead to a decrease of τ1.
The discussion of the conditional fixation time τA1 is not as straightforward,
because the sign of a − b − c + d can be positive or negative. The sign of this
quantity is also decisive for the evolutionary dynamics in other contexts, see e.g.
[43]. When the advantage of an A individual is initially large and decreases with
the abundance of A (a − c > b − d > 0), then the sign of a − b − c + d is positive
and τA1 decreases with increasing intensity of selection. But when the advantage
of strategy A decreases with the number of A individuals (b − d > a − c > 0),
then τA1 increases with increasing intensity of selection. However, this apparently
counterintuitive phenomenon (after all, A dominates B) can only be observed for
weak selection. For strong selection, τA1 decreases again. These results are compatible
with the observation that the conditional fixation time scales as N lnN for large N
[26]. In Figure 2 (a) we show a numerical example for the rescaled average times. We
include averages from numerical simulations of the evolutionary process, our linear
approximation as well as the exact result that can be obtained from dividing equation
(14) by (18) and equation (15) by (19), respectively. The payoff matrix is chosen
such that a + d > b + c, which means that with increasing intensity of selection τA1
decreases and τ1 increases.
7.2. Coexistence of A and B.
As a second class, we consider games in which B is the best reply to A (c > a), but
A is the best reply to B (b > d). Important examples for such games are the Hawk-
Dove game [44] or the Snowdrift game [45]. For infinite populations, the replicator
dynamics predicts a stable coexistence of A and B. In finite populations, the system
typically fluctuates around that point until eventually, fluctuations lead to absorption
in one the boundaries [46, 47]. Consequently, the conditional fixation times increase
exponentially with the population size [26]. Since a − b − c + d is negative, we
also have an increase of τA1 with the selection intensity for weak selection. Further,
N(b − d) − a + d is positive in large populations, such that also τ1 increases with
the selection intensity. Figure 2 (b) shows that the divergence of the exact results is
faster than the linear approximation even for weak selection.
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7.3. Coordination games.
Finally, let us discuss coordination games in which a > c and b < d. In these games,
A is the best reply to A and B is the best reply to B. The replicator equation of
such systems exhibits a bistability: If the fraction of A individuals is sufficiently high
in the beginning, the A individuals will reach fixation. Otherwise, B individuals
will take over the system. The stronger the intensity of selection, the less likely it
is that a single A individual can take over a B population. Consequently, τ1 should
decrease with β. This also follows from our weak selection approximation: In large
populations, N(b− d)− a+ d is negative and thus τ1 decreases with the intensity of
selection, see equation (30). Perhaps less intuitive, also τA1 decreases with β, which
results from a − b − c + d > 0, cf. (30). However, this is again consistent with the
observation that τA1 scales as N lnN in large populations. Although the fixation
probability of a single A decreases with β, if such an event occurs, it is faster than
in the neutral case. A numerical example for this behavior is shown in Figure 2 (c).
The numerical examples indicate that the convergence radius of our weak
selection expansion is of the order of N−1, which is also known for many systems in
population genetics. Although N−1 might appear small, this kind of weak selection
is the most relevant limit in evolutionary biology, as evolutionary change is typically
only connected with small selective differences. We stress that we have made no
assumptions on the population size, such that our results are valid for arbitrary N .
Our approach shows under which circumstances the general features of the game
are reflected in the fixation times under weak selection. Although the weak selection
expansion of the mean exit or fixation times is technically rather tedious, the resulting
asymptotic behavior shows remarkable simplicity.
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Figure 2: Expectation values of the rescaled fixation times starting with a single A mutant
in a population of B as a function of the selection intensity β. Full lines show the normalized
exact solution originating from the exact results (21) and (23). Colored dashed lines are the linear
approximations (30) and (31). Symbols show the results from simulations based on 107 realizations,
which agree nicely with the exact results. Diamonds are for the unconditional averages, circles are
for the conditional averages. On the right hand side, we show the payoff matrices of the three games
and illustrate the direction of selection in these games. (a) In a game with dominance of strategy
A, the unconditional fixation time increases with the intensity of selection, but the conditional
fixation time decreases. (b) For games with stable coexistence, both fixation times increase with
the intensity of selection. (c) For coordination games, the two fixation times become shorter when
the intensity of selection is increased. In all examples, the population size is N = 100.
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Appendix A. Finite double sums
Here, we collect some helpful calculations for double sums as they appear in the
mean exit times. An important observation is
N−1∑
k=i
k∑
l=1
fl
N − l = (N − i)
i−1∑
l=1
fl
N − l +
N−1∑
l=i
fl, (A.1)
for any function fl < ∞ and l = 1, . . . , N − 1. This can be seen by writing the left
hand side term by term, i. e.
N−1∑
k=i
k∑
l=1
fl
N − l =
f1
N − 1 + . . .+
fi
N − i
+
f1
N − 1 + . . .+
fi
N − i +
fi+1
N − (i+ 1)
+ . . .
+
f1
N − 1 + . . .+
fi
N − i + . . .+
fN−1
N − (N − 1) (A.2)
= (N − i)
i∑
l=1
fl
N − l
+ (N − i− 1) fi+1
N − (i+ 1) + . . .+ fN−1
= (N − i)
i−1∑
l=1
fl
N − l +
N−1∑
l=i
fl.
For the case i = 1 the result is especially simple, since the first sum of the right hand
side of equation (A.1) vanishes. This case is of special interest for the computation
of tA1 under neutral selection with fl = 1 and for t1 with fl = 1/l.
Another finding for double sums withM ∈ N and two bounded functions fk and
gl is
M∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fk gl =
M∑
l=1
gl
M∑
k=l
fk. (A.3)
This becomes clear by resorting the terms again,
M∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fk gl = f1g1 + f2(g1 + g2) + . . .+ fM(g1 + g2 + . . .+ gM)
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= g1(f1 + . . .+ fM) + g2(f2 + . . .+ fM) + . . .+ gMfM
=
M∑
l=1
gl
M∑
k=l
fk. (A.4)
Appendix B. Fixation times under weak selection
Here, we calculate the linear corrections of the mean exit times t1 and t
A
1 for the
Fermi process in detail, compare equations (21) and (23). We aim at finding these
times for weak selection, e.g.
t1 ≈ [t1]β=0 + β
[
∂
∂β
t1
]
β=0
. (B.1)
The first term follows directly from the calculation in Appendix A, see equation (18).
Our goal here is to compute the linear term
[
∂
∂β
t1
]
β=0
.[
∂
∂β
t1
]
β=0
=
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
[
1
T+l
∂φ1
∂β
+ φ1
∂
∂β
1
T+l
]
β=0
−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
[
φ1
T+l
k∑
m=l+1
∆pi(m)
]
β=0
, (B.2)
where we applied
[∏k
m=l+1 γm
]
β=0
= 1 and
[
∂
∂β
∏k
m=l+1 γm
]
β=0
= −∑km=l+1 ∆pi(m).
For the fixation probability under weak selection and with ∆pi(l) = u l + v, we have[
∂φl
∂β
]
β=0
=
l
N
(N − l)(N + l)u+ 3v
6
. (B.3)
The weak selection approximation of the inverse of the transition probability T+l ,
compare equation (8), yields[
∂
∂β
1
T+l
]
β=0
= − N
2
l(N − l)(u l + v). (B.4)
Thisleads to [
∂
∂β
t1
]
β=0
=
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
(N − 1)((N + 1)u+ 3v)
6N
2N2
l(N − l)
−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
1
N
N2
l(N − l) (u l + v)
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−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
1
N
2N2
l(N − l)
k∑
m=1+l
(um+ v) (B.5)
While the first two double sums can be solved with the help of Appendix A, the third
term is more complicated. For this more tedious calculation, we refer to Appendix
C. Eventually, the solution of the double and triple sums leads to[
∂
∂β
t1
]
β=0
= N(N − 1)(N + 1)u+ 3v
3
HN−1
−N(N − 1)u−NHN−1v
−N(N − 1)
(
((N + 1)u+ 3v)
3
HN−1 − u− v
)
= v N(N − 1−HN−1), (B.6)
where the last step is elementary. Combining this with equation (18) leads finally to
the unconditional mean exit time under weak selection, equation (22).
For the conditional fixation time tA1 , the linear term
[
∂
∂β
tA1
]
β=0
reads[
∂
∂β
tA1
]
β=0
=
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
[
1
T+l
∂φl
∂β
+ φl
∂
∂β
1
T+l
]
β=0
−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
[
φl
T+l
k∑
m=l+1
∆pi(m)
]
β=0
. (B.7)
The only difference compared to the unconditional fixation time, equation (B.2),
is the fixation probability φl instead of φ1. The linear term of the weak selection
expansion of φl is given in equation (B.3). This yields[
∂
∂β
tA1
]
β=0
=
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
l(N − l)((N + l)u+ 3v)
6N
2N2
l(N − l)
−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
l
N
N2
l(N − l) (u l + v)
−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
l
N
2N2
l(N − l)
k∑
m=l+1
(um+ v). (B.8)
Again, the first two double sums can be solved using the results from Appendix
A. The third term follows from a calculation which is similar to Appendix C, but
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simpler. This last term reduces to
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
l
N
2N2
l(N − l)
k∑
m=l+1
(um+ v)
= N
(N − 2)(N − 1)
18
((5N + 3)u+ 9v) . (B.9)
Finally, combining the three terms again results in[
∂
∂β
tA1
]
β=0
=
N2(N − 1)
18
((4N + 1)u+ 9v)
− N(N − 1)
2
(Nu+ 2v)
− (N − 2)N(N − 1)
18
((5N + 3)u+ 9v)
= − uN(N − 1)N
2 +N − 6
18
. (B.10)
In combination with equation (19), this results in the conditional mean exit time
under weak selection, equation (24).
For completeness, we briefly repeat this calculation for the mean exit times of
the frequency dependent Moran process. With the transition probabilities (25) and
(26), the fixation probabilities under weak selection are identical to those of the Fermi
process, see equation (20). However, the inverse transition probability is different in
the weak selection regime, i. e. the linear correction is[
∂
∂β
1
T+l
]
β=0
= −N
l
∆pi(l) = −N u l + v
l
. (B.11)
Hence, for the unconditional mean exit time we have the same starting equation
(B.2). But with equation (B.11) this gives[
∂
∂β
t1
]
β=0
=
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
(N − 1)((N + 1)u+ 3v)
6N
N2
l(N − l)
−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
1
N
N
u l + v
l
−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
1
N
N2
l(N − l)
k∑
m=1+l
(um+ v), (B.12)
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which differs from equation (B.5) only in the second double sum. With the previous
findings for the Fermi processes times the required calculation is straightforward and
results in [
∂
∂β
t1
]
β=0
= v
N
2
(N + 1− 2HN) . (B.13)
That is, this linear correction has a different dependence on the system size N .
For the conditional mean exit time the situation is similar. In difference to equation
(B.8), the linear correction reads[
∂
∂β
tA1
]
β=0
=
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
l(N − l)((N + l)u+ 3v)
6N
N2
l(N − l)
−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
l
N
N
u l + v
l
−
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
l
N
2N2
l(N − l)
k∑
m=l+1
(um+ v). (B.14)
This the leads to[
∂
∂β
tA1
]
β=0
= −u N
2
36
(
N2 − 3N + 2) , (B.15)
for the linear correction of the conditional mean exit times of the frequency dependent
Moran process.
Appendix C. Finite triple sum
Here, we calculate the triple sum from Appendix B, that require some additional
steps. Our goal is to solve
σ =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
1
l(N − l)
k∑
m=1+l
∆pi(m). (C.1)
For the sum over payoff differences, we have
k∑
m=1+l
∆pi(m) =
k∑
m=1+l
(um+ v) = fk − fl, (C.2)
where we introduced the function
fm = m(m+ 1)
u
2
+m v, (C.3)
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which is valid for any integer m. Using partial fraction expansion, N
l(N−l) =
1
l
+ 1
N−l ,
we obtain
σ =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fk
l(N − l) −
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fl
l(N − l)
=
1
N
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fk
l︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
+
1
N
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fk
N − l︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
− 1
N
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fl
l︸ ︷︷ ︸
K3
− 1
N
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fl
N − l︸ ︷︷ ︸
K4
. (C.4)
We solve each part separately, starting with the last one. For K4, we obtain with
equation (A.1) from Appendix A
K4 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fl
N − l =
N−1∑
k=1
fk =
N − 1
6
N((N + 1)u+ 3v). (C.5)
The second last term, K3, is a sum over a linear function and can be treated with
any table of elementary sums, e. g. [48],
K3 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fl
l
=
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
((l + 1)
u
2
+ v)
=
N − 1
12
N((N + 4)u+ 6v). (C.6)
The remaining two terms require more effort. Both terms, K1 and K2 have the same
structure regarding functions of k and l. Using equation (A.3), we have
K2 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fk
N − l =
N−1∑
l=1
1
N − l
N−1∑
k=l
fk, (C.7)
and
K1 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
fk
l
=
N−1∑
l=1
1
l
N−1∑
k=l
fk. (C.8)
Hence, we first have to compute the sum
∑N−1
k=l fk, which reduces to the solution of
elementary sums,
N−1∑
k=l
fk =
N−1∑
k=l
k((k + 1)
u
2
+ v) =
u
2
N−1∑
k=l
k2 +
(u
2
+ v
)N−1∑
k=l
k
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=
N − l
6
(
N2 +Nl + l2 − 1)u+ 3(N + l − 1)v)
=
N − l
6
(
N2 +Nl + l2 − 1)u+ N − l
2
(N + l − 1) v. (C.9)
Thus, solving equations (C.7) and (C.8) simplifies to solving the elementary sums∑N−1
l=1 l
s with s = 0, 1, 2, compare [48]. With this, we have
K2 =
N − 1
6
N−1∑
l=1
((N + 1)u+ 3v) +
Nu+ 3v
6
N−1∑
l=1
l +
u
6
N−1∑
l=1
l2
=
N − 1
36
(
(11N2 −N − 6)u+ 9(3N − 2)v) . (C.10)
For K1, we obtain
K1 =
1
6
N−1∑
l=1
N(N − 1)(N + 1)u+ 3N(N − 1)v
l
− 1
6
N−1∑
l=1
(
(l2 − 1)u− 3(l − 1)v)
=
N(N − 1)
6
((N + 1)u+ 3v) HN−1
− N − 1
36
(N − 2)((2N + 3)u+ 9v).
Summing up the terms, σ = (K1 +K2 −K3 −K4)/N , finally yields the result
σ =
N − 1
6
(((N + 1)u+ 3v)HN−1 − 3(u+ v)) . (C.11)
Again, Hn =
∑n
l=1 1/l are the harmonic numbers. In equation (B.9), the reasoning
is very similar, but only terms of the structure of K2 and K4 appear.
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